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Although housing can be a powerful channel of monetary policy transmission this channel 
can be weakened by social customs and financial liberalization as well as accompanying 
innovation that create alternatives to bank mortgages controlled by a central bank.  This 
paper utilizes some unique questions in the 1999 and 2002 Cyprus Surveys of Consumer 
Finances, as well as data from the 1998 and 2001 US Surveys of Consumer Finances, in order 
to study the role of social customs (in the form of parental housing gifts) and financial 
liberalization for the incidence of homeownership rates, mortgage debt and borrowing 
constraints.  Unlike existing studies of financially developed countries, the data from the 
Cyprus Surveys suggest that only a very small proportion of Cypriot households are credit 
constrained and that a number of important economic characteristics of the household are 
irrelevant for homeownership and for the use of mortgages.  Our findings suggest that the 
presence of such customs may interfere with the monetary transmission mechanism by 
limiting the sensitivity of housing investment to changes in credit market conditions.   
Financial liberalization leading to innovation could work in the opposite direction if it leads 
to increased household participation in formal loans controlled by the central bank. 
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1.  Introduction 
Housing can play a central role in the monetary transmission mechanism, through 
numerous channels. A number of channels run through the effects of policies on demand for 
housing. Policy-induced changes in interest rates affect the interest-rate component of the user 
cost of housing, as well as the expected capital gains component through their effects on 
expectations regarding future policies. Higher interest rates imply higher opportunity costs of 
using the house, and this negative demand effect can be reinforced by creation of expectations 
of future tightness, leading to lower rates of expected house price appreciation.  
In addition to the direct demand effects, there is a host of indirect effects. First, there are 
wealth effects if policy-induced appreciations of house prices make people feel richer and 
consume more. Second, house price increases raise the collateral households can offer for 
consumer loans and thus raise borrowing limits and improve the terms on which such loans can 
be had. This is especially true in countries with developed home equity loans, where house 
price increases make more consumable resources available to households directly. Third, for 
given loan to value ratios, higher prices raise the down-payment amount that households need 
to collect before they buy a house, thus exerting an opposite effect on consumption. Fourth, 
lower nominal interest rates lower the level of ‘committed expenditures’ of households for 
servicing their mortgages, facilitating consumption. Finally, on the supply side, lower interest 
rates imply lower costs to developers, thus promoting housing construction.  
Mishkin (2007) provides a nice overview of the issues involved in assessing the 
empirical importance of such effects and of the existing literature. While some empirical 
findings are contradictory or method-dependent, the overall conclusion from empirical research 
is that housing plays a quantitatively important role in the monetary transmission.
1  
Underlying standard discussions of the importance of housing for monetary policy is the 
view that households have access to, and make use of a developed mortgage market, and they   2
expect their descendants to make similar use of mortgage and credit market opportunities. This 
is perfectly legitimate for the United States and for a number of countries with highly 
developed financial sectors where young people are expected to resort to the market for home 
purchase. However, in countries with more traditional family links and possibly less developed 
financial sectors, the housing channel for monetary policy transmission may be weakened by 
social customs or informal arrangements that reduce reliance on, or bypass altogether, the 
mortgage market when acquiring a home.  
Consider, for example, the case of families who received a house from their parents as 
an inter vivos gift or as a bequest, and intend to provide their own children with housing gifts or 
bequests because of time-honored social norms. It is reasonable to expect the housing demand 
of such households to be quite interest rate inelastic, and the response of their consumption to 
changes in house prices more limited. Higher interest rates and lower expected house price 
increases are likely to be less important in reducing housing demand, as housing is not viewed 
simply as part of an entire asset menu but as an obligation of caring parents to their children. 
House price increases may be opportunities to get bigger loans for own consumption, but using 
the house as collateral interferes with the objective of providing children with housing free of 
debt obligations. House purchase decisions are shifted from young households with limited 
finances that are sensitive to changes in nominal interest rates and associated committed 
expenditures, to middle-aged households at their peak of employment income and of asset 
accumulation.  
Similarly, the extent of financial innovation encouraged by financial liberalization can 
limit the sensitivity of mortgages to monetary policy. A body of recent literature has argued that 
the practice of mortgage securitization has decreased borrowing constraints and thus inhibited 
the effectiveness of monetary policy; and that the availability of non-bank resources has created 
substitutes to bank lending (see Brady, 2004).    3
Understanding how social customs and limited mortgage market development can affect 
homeownership is particularly important when countries in which these are relevant are subject 
to monetary policy coordination with partners characterized by highly developed and 
extensively used mortgage markets. A topical example is the recent enlargement of the EU and 
of the Eurozone. This paper uses detailed household-level data from two extremes: a recent EU 
and Eurozone entrant (Cyprus), and a country at the opposite end of the spectrum of financial 
development and reliance on mortgages (the US), to illustrate the importance of social customs 
and financial development for homeownership and mortgage financing. Home provision driven 
by social customs (such as housing gifts and dowries) is contrasted to home acquisition 
facilitated by financial institutions with well-defined credit scoring criteria based on household 
resources, occupational status, and other pertinent characteristics. 
The analysis uses detailed household-level data from the two existing waves (1999 and 
2002) of the Cyprus Surveys of Consumer Finances, as well as data from the US Survey of 
Consumer Finances for comparable years (1998 and 2001). Besides being the only new entrant 
with extensive household-level data on portfolios, Cyprus has recently experienced financial 
liberalization, accompanied by financial innovation and combined with dramatic swings in 
asset prices; and it has a strong tradition of inter vivos parental housing gifts.
2 It thus provides a 
useful testing ground for the importance of both financial liberalization/innovation and social 
customs for the housing market. 
Cyprus is a country with close family ties and persistent and widespread social customs. 
Houses are often provided as a parental gift to children, typically to a new bride. Given the 
typically small age differences between parents and children, housing gifts often take the form 
of an extra floor built on top of the parents’ house, at parents’ expense. Effectively, parents use 
their own resources and collateral to finance the building of their children’s home. Partly for 
this reason, the incidence of binding borrowing constraints is extremely low in Cyprus   4
compared to that observed in the US. Sometimes, construction is planned years ahead of the 
child’s ‘coming of age’, but it usually takes place when children approach adulthood or 
transition to married life. Thus, the resources of middle-aged, typically asset-holding parents 
are used to secure mortgages, instead of the limited resources of a young couple starting its 
economic life.  Indicative of the above is the fact that in the case of Cyprus housing loans make 
up only 44% of the GDP despite the fact that 80% of households own their primary residence.  
As a result, construction is much less an economic decision weighing costs against benefits, but 
a social obligation unlikely to be elastic with respect to interest rates.  
Interest rates were liberalized only as of 1
st January 2001, allowing the Central Bank of 
Cyprus to conduct monetary policy through interest rate management for the first time. The 
transition to the liberalized environment was smooth, and banks applied the usual market 
principles in differentiating lending interest rates according to client specific risk and credit 
worthiness. Alongside the banking sector, important players in commercial financing of house 
purchases are cooperative societies, with much more localized clienteles and stronger personal 
relations, but also less easily controllable by the monetary authorities compared to banks
3. 
Cyprus is a country with high homeownership rates (of the order of 80%) and renewed 
interest in real estate, especially following recent dramatic developments in the stock market.
4 
Following the burst of the stock market bubble, most investors essentially found themselves 
locked into the stock market by having purchased shares in investment companies, and direct 
participation rates were measured at more than 50% even in 2002 (Table 1). Disappointment 
with the stock market, combined with low interest rates, resulted in increased flows of other 
funds to housing, with the share of housing and construction loans in new bank credit granted 
rising from below 30% in 2000, to 76% by 2003.
5  
We exploit this confluence of time-honored social customs, financial liberalization and 
innovation, strong importance of the housing sector, and detailed data to study determinants of   5
homeownership and mortgage behavior and potential links to monetary policy. In section 2, we 
provide background information on monetary policy in Cyprus, on the importance of the 
housing market, and on household assets and liabilities generally. The variables from the 
Cyprus Surveys of Consumer Finances are described in section 3, as are first estimation results 
for Cyprus. Section 4 attempts to shed some light on the relevance of social customs by 
studying econometrically factors that contribute to receiving housing gifts and to expecting to 
leave a bequest. Section 5 reports findings for Cyprus that control for receipt of housing gifts or 
of gifts and inheritances more generally. Section 6 reports our findings for the US and 
compares them with the Cyprus findings. Section 7 concludes. Variable definitions and short 
description of the samples appear in two Appendices. 
 
2.  Household Finances and Monetary Policy in Cyprus 
2.1. Household finances and the prevalence of housing gifts 
The Cyprus Survey of Consumer Finances provides a comprehensive source for assets and 
liabilities of Cyprus households, along with demographic characteristics and attitudes towards 
borrowing, lending, risk taking, liquidity and related matters. Two waves of data, for 1999 and 
for 2002, are used in this paper. The Appendix gives a brief description of the sample. Extensive 
information on Survey design is available in Karagrigoriou (2005). 
Table 1 shows that, in both waves of the Survey, about 90% of households hold some 
type of financial asset.
6 The enormous spread of stockholding (51.4% of households 
participated by 2002 compared to 25.3% in 1999) was mainly due to the establishment of 
‘Demetra’, the Co-operative Society’s investment company, in which almost all clients of the 
Co-operative sector bought shares. Over the same period, investment in government bonds 
became significantly less widespread.
7   6
Turning to non-financial assets,
8 the homeownership rate (more than 80%) significantly 
exceeds that in the US (about two thirds). Approximately 30% of households report having a 
mortgage (Table 2) and this represents for those more than 50% of household debt (Table 3). 
Comparison of Tables 2 and 3 reveals that both household participation in home secured 
mortgages as well as their overall share in total household loans
9 decreased slightly in 2002 
compared to 1999.  
Tables 4 and 5 provide figures for participation and for conditional shares in total 
household debt for different age groups. For home secured debt, both initially increase with age 
and reach their maximum in the age group 30-39, to decrease sharply from interval 50-59 on. 
Although 86% and 83.1% of Cyprus households report in 1999 and 2002, respectively, that 
they own their primary residence (Table 1), only about half of homeowners report having ever 
taken out mortgages on the current residence. Mortgages are very important for those who do 
hold them, as they account for more than half of all their household debts (Table 3).  
The self-reported incidence of binding borrowing constraints is extremely limited in 
Cyprus. Only 1.8% of households report in 1999 that they are liquidity constrained in the sense 
of ever having their request for a loan rejected or curtailed, or having been discouraged from 
applying, and only 1.7% do so in 2002. By contrast, existing literature on borrowing constraints 
in highly financially developed countries suggests that the incidence of binding borrowing 
constraints is of the order of 20%.
10Although underreporting in survey questions on loans and 
indebtedness is a widely known problem, it is unclear why it should be a much more severe 
factor for households in Cyprus than elsewhere, especially given the size of the gap. 
A number of factors are likely to be responsible for this strong finding in Cyprus. One is 
the traditionally low unemployment rate, implying small unemployment risk for loan recipients. 
Another is the consistently upward path of property prices in Cyprus, which have never 
registered a decline since the establishment of the independent Cyprus state in 1960, ensuring   7
capital gains for loan collateral. A third factor is the overwhelming importance attached by 
Cyprus households to their home. In view of this, banks know that, in difficult times, 
households will be willing to cut back on other types of expenditures to make sure they repay 
their mortgage. A further likely contributing factor is a tendency of commercial banks in 
Cyprus, or co-operatives that operate in parallel to banks, to be less strict in lending money to 
higher risk groups (e.g., young, low income, etc.) than their counterparts abroad. Although it is 
difficult to evaluate this conjecture, there is some evidence of at least lack of persistence in 
rejecting loan applications.
11  
Social customs are also likely to contribute heavily to the limited incidence of 
borrowing constraints in Cyprus. In addition to the fact that the presence of a family safety net 
makes downpayments easier and provides additional guarantees to a bank., there is a time-
honored tendency of Cyprus parents to provide the house as a gift or to assume mortgages that 
the young household would otherwise have to secure based on its own resources. Table 6 shows 
that housing gifts are indeed quite widespread, across households of different characteristics 
and not confined to poorer or less educated households. Just under 40% of Cyprus households, 
representing more than 45% of homeowners, report that they have received their current 
residence as a gift. This is an understatement of the prevalence of such gifts, as it omits 
households who received such a gift at some point but are currently not living in the house they 
received. Households living in the house received as a gift are spread across age groups 
relatively evenly, except for the youngest and the oldest groups. While heads of most such 
households do not have a college degree, about 30 percent of them fall in the highest education 
category. Over 90% are married, reflecting the typical nature of housing gifts, namely as 
wedding gifts. They are equally distributed among the three bottom quartiles of income 
distribution, with smaller representation from those in the top quartile. They are equally 
distributed among the four quartiles of the non-residential wealth distribution.   8
 
2.2. Monetary policy and the housing market in Cyprus 
Financial liberalization was recently implemented in Cyprus. After a very long period of 
statutory ceilings in lending interest rates, interest rates were fully liberalized in January 2001. 
Following full liberalization, a Monetary Policy Committee was set up with the goal of setting 
and implementing monetary policy decisions. In July 2002, a new Central Bank of Cyprus Law 
was enacted giving the Central Bank full independence from the government and setting out 
price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy. Price stability was not defined by an 
explicit numerical target, and the Central Bank was to achieve this goal through a fixed 
exchange rate system.
12  
The Cyprus Stock Exchange (CSE) was officially launched in 1996. After the 1999 
stock market bubble and its subsequent burst, Cyprus investors lost their trust in the stock 
market. At the same time, the low interest rates paid by banks for time and savings accounts 
encouraged investors to find alternatives. What followed was an inflow of funds into real estate, 
with a concomitant rise in the importance of this sector in terms of its share in annual credit by 
banks. The increased demand raised property prices, which in some cases more than doubled, 
prompting the Central Bank of Cyprus to consider corrective monetary policy measures. 
The issue at hand was how to achieve the goal of price stability in the presence of a 
possible property bubble. Two prominent views were considered. One suggests that a central 
bank should intervene only if asset price changes signal changes in expected inflation 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 2001). The other argues that central banks can improve macroeconomic 
performance by reacting systematically to asset price misalignments, over and above their 
reaction to inflation forecasts and output gap (Cecchetti et al, 2003). In addition to these views, 
the Central Bank recognized that close family ties that still affect the housing market 
complicate things even further. Mention was made of the practice of getting a house or a big   9
part of it as a gift from parents and of its potential to reduce the incidence of liquidity 
constraints and thus interfere with the monetary transmission mechanism.  
The Central Bank took a series of measures. First, the Bank consistently stated in its 
monetary policy statements that it regarded the rise in property prices ‘unwarranted’. The 
statements were followed by a circular to commercial banks urging them to carefully evaluate 
all requests for financing property investments, and to avoid financing more than 70% of the 
value of the property. At around the same time, the Monetary Policy Committee, in an 
unscheduled meeting, raised the official interest rates by 100 basis points, albeit primarily as a 
pre-emptive step in calming fears of a possible devaluation of the Cyprus pound. However, the 
rate increase, coupled with the initial measures taken by the Central Bank, turned out to be 
effective in cooling the property market only temporarily, with prices continuing their upward 
trend since then, proving that the available tools have been inefficient in affecting the housing 
market. In  2007 the CBC has restricted further the amount of financing to 60% of the value of 
the property in a further effort of affecting the continuing rise of property prices.   In January 
2008 Cyprus joined the eurozone and made Euro its official currency. 
 
3.  Determinants of Homeownership and Mortgage Behavior in Cyprus 
Surveys of household finances usually report currently outstanding liabilities, including 
mortgages. The Cyprus SCF contains a unique question on whether households currently have 
or have ever had a mortgage on their primary residence. In this Section, we report results from 
probit estimation with selection for the incidence of currently having, or having ever had, a 
mortgage, conditional on homeownership.  
The presence of refugees since the separation of the island in 1974 calls for attention in 
defining the estimation sample. Although most households in the full sample face the usual 
homeownership choices, households with refugee status had special treatment with respect to   10
housing. Our estimation sample includes refugee households that were given the opportunity to 
obtain some government funds in order to acquire a home. Such households still have to make 
an explicit choice of whether they will own a home or not, and conditional on owning, whether 
to get a mortgage (to finance a bigger home). The fact that they have received funds to facilitate 
the purchase of a primary residence is controlled for in the regressions. Two other categories of 
refugees are excluded from the estimation, as they do not own a home but they cannot be 
identified with renters in the usual sense.
13 
 
3.1. Determinants of homeownership  
We first report estimation results for homeownership (Table 7, bottom panel). As is the case 
in other countries, marital status has a strongly significant effect on homeownership, with 
married households being more likely to own a home (controlling for other factors). To the 
extent that parental gifts are given as wedding presents, it is natural to expect that married status 
would contribute to the incidence of owning a home. But even if housing is not received as a 
gift, marriage is a life transition often associated with house purchase.
14  
Controlling for marital status, having children also contributes positively to the 
tendency to own a home. This effect of children must be coming mainly from households that 
purchase their home in response to the needs arising from a larger household size. It is unlikely 
that parental housing gifts are conditional upon, or significantly encouraged by the arrival of 
children, as they tend to be given just before the wedding, if not earlier. However, social 
custom may be playing a role even in this case, if having children (rather than not having any) 
captures partly social background factors, such as belonging to “traditional” families, not 
already incorporated in the regressors. 
In countries where homes are predominantly purchased rather than received as gifts, one 
would expect financial resources of the household to be key determinants of homeownership.   11
Household income is likely to play a role in terms of whether the household can afford a house 
and is likely to pass the screening of loan officers. Non-housing real wealth and financial 
wealth would provide resources to meet down payments, and could also serve as collateral and 
as useful precautionary buffers in the face of income or expenditure risk combined with 
committed expenditures (e.g., mortgage payments). Yet, we find that two of these three 
‘economic’ factors (income and non-residential real wealth) make no statistically significant 
contribution to the incidence of homeownership in Cyprus. Such insignificance could be 
produced by a widespread practice of parental housing gifts not dependent on the financial 
conditions of the receiving household, or even by a practice of giving gifts to needier children –
running in the opposite direction of screening criteria employed by loan officers. 
Occupational status of the household member in charge of finances (respondent) is not 
found to have an important influence on homeownership. This is true even for respondents who 
are ‘not working’, i.e. unemployed or students. The category ‘others’ include respondents out of 
the labor force. If survey responses reflect accurately the overall work status of the household 
and not just of the respondent (an issue that matters only for couples), then insignificance points 
to irrelevance of occupational status for homeownership. This would be consistent with 
extended family safety nets or housing transfers from parents that eliminate the need to finance 
the purchase of a home out of own resources. But for couples, irrelevance of respondent 
occupational status may also be partly due to risk sharing within the household. Turning the 
estimates around, since the omitted variable is retirement, insignificant occupational dummies 
imply that retirement status per se does not diminish the tendency of the household to own a 
house, controlling for age and other factors.
15 
Having a college or university degree or a major professional qualification (such as 
chartered or certified accountant status) has a statistically significant negative effect. Although 
this negative effect may be due partly to social customs, the presence of such customs is not   12
necessary to generate it: our findings for the US (reported below) also indicate a negative effect 
of college education on homeownership. It is possible that the US finding is partly attributable 
to greater geographical mobility and need for flexibility of college graduates, but another factor 
is that, for given age, having college education tends to imply a shorter working life to date, 
reducing the likelihood of homeownership for given age and resources Differential 
geographical mobility is unlikely to be a major factor in a very small country like Cyprus, but 
shorter working life should still matter, with an additional twist. Since accredited universities 
did not exist in Cyprus until 1992, higher education acts also as a proxy for the part of their 
adult life that household members have spent in Cyprus, whether working or not. In a country 
where parental gifts of homes are prevalent, factors contributing to a negative coefficient could 
also include a tendency of highly educated children not to request or accept free housing from 
their parents; or parents who finance college education as an alternative to providing a housing 
gift. We return to these issues below, when we study who gets housing gifts.  
Age is estimated to influence homeownership, with the quadratic term (signaling a 
hump shape) just failing to be significant at the 10% level. It should be remembered that our 
data come from two cross sections, so that age, time, and cohort effects cannot be separately 
identified. Our estimation here effectively sets cohort effects to zero. This may not be 
unreasonable for housing in Cyprus, as owning the primary residence has been a dominant 
priority for very many years.  
We do not find that having been turned down for a loan significantly discourages 
homeownership. The small number of households that declare being liquidity constrained and 
the lack of statistical significance of this variable when controlling for other factors do not leave 
much room for arguing that borrowing constraints play an important role in the homeownership 
decision of Cyprus households. In principle, one might suspect that both findings are the result 
of massive underreporting of the incidence of borrowing constraints by households that   13
associate being turned down for a loan with some “stigma”. However, such suspicion would 
run against casual observation and the general perception of Cyprus households that getting a 
loan is relatively straightforward in a financial system that includes both standard commercial 
banks and cooperative societies less subject to supervision. 
We do not find a statistically significant influence of gender of financial respondent on the 
incidence of homeownership, controlling for other characteristics. Finally, the 2002 dummy is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting little change in homeownership between 1999 and 2002, 
despite the intervening financial liberalization, once we control for other characteristics. 
 
3.2. Determinants of the incidence of mortgages  
Table 7 (top panel) shows the regressions for currently having or having ever had a 
mortgage on the current primary residence, observed only for homeowners. Controlling for 
other factors, the older the respondent is, the less likely it is that acquisition of the current 
residence was financed through a mortgage, wholly or partly. Given the retrospective nature of 
the question, this result probably reflects the increased likelihood of older households to have 
moved from their first owned residence.
16 Moves that involve downsizing, acceptance of an 
inheritance, or upgrading to a larger house would all contribute to a negative estimate.  
We find that having a female in charge of finances makes it significantly less likely that 
the house has been financed through a mortgage, controlling for other factors. This finding is 
consistent with the view that parents are more likely to provide a housing gift to their daughters 
than to their sons, a view that we put to a statistical test below. It is also interesting to 
investigate whether part of this effect is related to differential tendency of female financial 
respondents to obtain mortgages – for demand or supply reasons – and we return to this below.   14
Being married was found to make it significantly more likely to own a home. However, 
married households or those with kids are no more likely to have (or have ever had) a 
mortgage, conditional on homeownership.  
Among resources in the form of income, non-residential real wealth, and financial 
wealth, only income is significant for having had a mortgage, and this only at the 10% 
significance level. If financial considerations were the primary determinant of whether a 
household obtains a mortgage, either through their influence on demand or through their 
influence on the readiness of lenders to grant mortgages, one would expect a closer link 
between resources and the incidence of mortgages. Doubts about the importance of resources 
are reinforced by noting that occupation and responses concerning borrowing constraints do not 
contribute to explaining which households ever had mortgages on the current residence, 
conditional on owning it.  
Although a college degree reduces the probability of homeownership, having a college 
degree significantly increases the probability of having financed the current residence through a 
mortgage, conditional on owning it. If future income prospects are a dominant consideration in 
mortgage choice, one would expect college education to contribute to the incidence of 
mortgages, both because of higher expected income growth and because of lower overall 
income risk. In terms of social customs, one might also expect that college educated children 
are more likely to get a mortgage, conditional on owning, both because they are less likely to be 
thinking in “traditional” ways and accepting housing gifts, and because their parents are more 
likely to have spent more on their education. We return to these issues below. 
A policy-relevant variable in Cyprus is the indicator of whether a household has been 
granted refugee financial support to acquire its residence (“aftostegasi”). In principle, purchase 
of a home through this scheme could discourage use of a mortgage, or it could also encourage 
for the purpose of acquiring a bigger house. Possibly because of these two conflicting effects,   15
we find no evidence that the incidence of financial housing support to refugee households has 
systematically influenced their tendency to have a mortgage on the current residence. 
We find a statistically significant and negative year effect for 2002 relative to 1999. 
This suggests that the incidence of having or having ever had a mortgage on the current 
residence was significantly lower among new homeowners between 1999 and 2002, relative to 
incumbents and to those who exited, despite the financial liberalization that took place between 
1999 and 2002. A possible factor contributing to this result is the dramatic stock market bubble 
in 1999 and its subsequent burst in 2000. Both the increase in stock market wealth and the 
subsequent disappointment with the stock market may have contributed to greater entry into the 
homeowner pool with non-borrowed funds during this period.  
  The continuation of Table 7 presents marginal effects of the variables, i.e. estimates of 
their contribution to the probability that a household has now or has ever had a mortgage on the 
current residence, conditional on owning. We find that being male increases the conditional 
probability by about 7 percentage points, and the effect is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Having advanced education and belonging to the 2002 sample have statistically 
significant and fairly large effects, positive and negative respectively. The effect of advanced 
education is of the order of 8 percentage points, while the incidence of current or past 
mortgages, given that a household is in the homeowner pool, is estimated to have dropped by 
about 7 percentage points between 1999 and 2002. Financial resources are not significant, with 
log income just missing the 10% significance mark. 
 
4.  Housing Gifts and Bequests in Cyprus 
4.1. Factors contributing to receipt of housing gifts 
Table 8 reports estimates of the influence of household demographics on the probability that 
the household has received its current residence as a gift.
17 We find that households where the   16
person in charge of finances is female are significantly more likely to have received their 
current residence as a gift. This is consistent with the popularly held view that housing gifts are 
primarily given to daughters, and thus single females or households with female heads are more 
likely to have received such gifts. Ideally, we would like to observe whether the household has 
ever received a housing gift, but this is not available in the data. So, strictly speaking, our 
findings refer to the joint event of getting a housing gift and remaining in that initial house by 
the time of the interview. It can also be partly due to a greater tendency of male-headed 
households to move to mortgage-financed homes after receiving their first home as a gift.  
Being married contributes to the probability of having received the current residence as a 
housing gift, consistent with the idea that housing gifts tend to be given as wedding gifts. On 
the face of it, having children should encourage a move to a bigger home. Still, having children 
is estimated to make it more likely that the current house was received as a gift. Since gifts are 
almost always given before the wedding, the presence of children may be capturing families 
with more ‘traditional’ values, where the incidence of housing gifts is likely to be greater. 
Current household resources do not influence the probability of having received the current 
residence as a housing gift, with the possible exception of current income which has a negative 
effect that is just statistically significant at the 10% level. Whether the respondent is currently 
unemployed or a student (‘not working’) is similarly irrelevant. Although we would ideally like 
to know if the household ever received a housing gift, and the level of household resources and 
the employment status at the time of receipt, this finding at least provides no basis for arguing 
that parents condition their housing gifts on the resources of their children, e.g. giving a house 
to poorer children but not to richer ones. Informal observation does suggest that parents tend to 
plan housing gifts long in advance of the actual transfer to their children, often as the children 
are growing up (if only because of ‘time to build’ considerations), when their children’s 
households are not formed and their financial situation is unknown.   17
Advance planning does raise the possibility, however, that parents choose whether to fund 
their children’s college education as an alternative to providing a housing gift.
18 If parents were 
to view these two options as alternatives, we would expect to find a systematic negative relation 
between college education and the probability of having received a housing gift. Other factors 
that might contribute to such a negative relationship are a smaller tendency of college graduates 
to accept such gifts from their parents and/or a greater tendency to move to a different house 
even if they have received their very first residence as a housing gift. In this very last case, the 
negative effect would diminish the continuing relevance of the custom over the life cycle of the 
household. Our estimate of the effect of having advanced education on the probability of having 
received a housing gift with regard to the current residence is indeed negative, but just 
significant at the 10% level.  
Finally, we find that households in the 2002 Survey are significantly less likely to have 
received part of their current residence as a housing gift, controlling for all other factors. As a 
three-year period is too short to register change in social customs, this is consistent with the 
view that some of the huge capital gains made in the stock market bubble of 1999 were 
channeled to the housing market, allowing households to move into homeownership or to 
upgrade to larger homes. A further contributing factor may have been the substantial financial 
liberalization that Cyprus underwent between the two Surveys. 
 
4.2. Who plans to leave bequests?  
Housing gifts form part of the broader issue of intergenerational transfers in Cyprus. Table 
9 reports findings on factors that make it more likely that a household will be expecting to leave 
a bequest. We find that having received part of the current residence as a gift or expecting to 
receive inheritance in the future both contribute to the expectation to leave a bequest. Since we   18
are controlling for the household’s current resources, this is likely to reflect a positive influence 
of the example of one’s own parents in terms of transfers to children. 
As expected, being married and having kids also contribute to the probability that the 
household plans to leave a bequest. Current household income does not appear to influence the 
decision, once accumulated financial assets, real assets other than the main residence of the 
current household, and also ownership of the current residence are controlled for. Controlling 
for current financial assets, success in the stock market (capital gains) exerts a positive further 
effect. This is an interesting case of the source and not just of the level of funds being relevant 
for the intention to leave a bequest. 
The gender of the financial respondent, which we have found to matter with respect to 
receiving housing gifts, does not matter for the intention to leave a bequest, controlling for the 
presence of kids. Of course, it should be remembered that this refers to any kind of bequest and 
not just housing transfers. Whether the respondent does or does not have college education and 
the level of outstanding mortgage debt on the principal residence do not matter for the intention 
to leave a bequest. The 2002 dummy is positive and strongly significant, suggesting that, if 
anything, bequest motives are getting stronger . 
 
5.  Controlling for Social Customs in Cyprus 
5.1. Controlling for receipt of housing gifts 
Estimates of the role of various factors in the incidence of mortgages (Table 7) were 
interpreted as potentially arising (at least partly) from the prevalence of housing gifts. In this 
section, we explicitly control for whether (at least part of) the current residence was received as 
a gift from parents, to derive the residual role of various factors in determining the incidence of 
mortgages conditional on homeownership .    19
Results of this estimation appear in Table 10. In the homeownership regression (bottom 
panel), the key differences are that now both age variables and the gender variable become 
statistically significant. When we control for housing gifts in the mortgage regression, we find a 
clear hump shaped relationship between homeownership and age, controlling for other factors 
and subject to the same qualifications mentioned with regard to Table 6. We also obtain a 
statistically significant negative effect of male gender on homeownership: controlling for other 
characteristics, including age and marital status, households in which the financial respondent 
(or the only member) is female are more likely to own a home.  
Since we are now controlling for whether the household has received the current residence 
as a gift, we can interpret findings as reflecting the role of each variable, for given gift taking 
behavior. The gift indicator variable is itself highly significant and with a negative sign, as 
expected.
19 Controlling for whether the household has received a housing gift, for marital 
status, financial and other factors, it is still the case that households with female heads/financial 
respondents are less likely to have taken out a mortgage than their male counterparts, and the 
effect is strongly statistically significant. This is likely to reflect a more limited tendency of 
female financial respondents to consider mortgages, as we are not aware of any, even anecdotal, 
evidence that female mortgage applicants are more likely to be turned down than men with 
similar characteristics, and we are controlling for self-reported borrowing constraints. Marital 
status is now irrelevant for whether the household has ever taken out a mortgage on the current 
residence, conditional on owning. 
Assets, whether financial or real beyond the main residence, are irrelevant for mortgage 
choice conditional on ownership, controlling for whether the household has received a gift; 
income is significant only at the 10% level. Controlling for whether the current residence was 
received as a parental gift, advanced education encourages the use of mortgages, consistent 
with demand and supply factors mentioned above. We also confirm the drop in the incidence of   20
mortgages, conditional on ownership, between 1999 and 2002 and the irrelevance of financial 
support for refugees (“aftostegasi”).  
All in all, the impression from these estimates, along with the limited incidence of self-
reported borrowing constraints, seem consistent with a market that does not restrict mortgages 
to those with large resources, but tends to attract male-headed, college-educated households. 
 
5.2. Controlling for receipt of inheritance or gift more generally 
The final regression based on CySCF alone is intended to pave the way for comparison with 
US data. The US SCF does not ask whether the current residence was obtained, in whole or in 
part, as a gift from parents. It does ask, however, whether the household has received an 
inheritance or been given substantial assets in a trust or in some other form. The CySCF 
includes a question that is quite similar to the SCF and refers to whether the household has ever 
inherited wealth or a gift from parents or relatives. Table 11 presents results from a two-stage 
probit for Cyprus where this inheritance/gift variable is used in the mortgage equation.  
Use of this broader control has little influence on results. As Table 11 (bottom) shows, 
results in the homeownership regression are very similar. Results on the incidence of having 
ever had a mortgage on the current residence are shown in the top panel of Table 11. Like 
housing gifts, receipt of inheritance or gift from parents is also strongly statistically significant 
and makes it less likely that the household has ever taken out a mortgage on the current 
residence. Signs and significance levels of the estimates are quite robust to use of this broader 
control variable, except that now income becomes significant for the incidence of mortgages.  
  
6.  The Contrast to United States Households 
As already mentioned, it is not possible to run exactly the same regressions for the US as 
we did for Cyprus. First, a retrospective aspect to the question on whether there is a mortgage   21
on the current residence is not available in US data. Second, there is no information on whether 
the current residence was obtained, in whole or in part, as a gift from parents. Indeed, the 
absence of this latter question from the questionnaire reflects in large part the different social 
customs in the US and the emphasis on young couples getting mortgages for their home. 
We carry out comparisons using two approaches. One is to run regressions using the two 
existing US variables, namely ‘still outstanding mortgage balance’ and ‘having received a gift 
or inheritance’. The other is to pool US and Cyprus data using as similar variables as possible 
and to compare marginal effects on the incidence of mortgages conditional on homeownership. 
 
6.1. Factors influencing homeownership in US Data 
Table 12 presents a two-stage probit using SCF data. In the absence of a retrospective 
question on past mortgages, we use instead the incidence of currently outstanding mortgages on 
the principal residence.
20 
The bottom panel of Table 12 reports estimates regarding homeownership. As in the 
Cyprus case, the age-homeownership profile is hump-shaped, and being married and having 
children contribute to homeownership. Somewhat more surprisingly, but still consistent with 
the Cyprus findings, having a college degree lowers the probability of owning the household’s 
residence, controlling for other factors. This finding for the US cannot be attributed to more 
limited willingness of the financial sector to grant financing to college graduates or from 
greater income risk or lower expectations of future income growth, as college graduates fare 
well in all those respects compared to their counterparts at lower levels of educational 
attainment. It may be related to more limited geographical attachment of more educated US 
households, or to a tendency to concentrate in more “professional” cities or areas likely to be 
associated with steeper house prices and organized apartment rental markets.   22
Unlike the Cyprus case, household resources (income, non-residential real wealth, and 
financial wealth) are all strongly statistically significant with a positive sign, making 
homeownership more likely. Borrowing constraints exert a strongly statistically significant 
negative effect on the incidence of homeownership, as one would expect in a country where 
homeownership depends crucially on availability of mortgages. The gender variable is 
statistically insignificant: whether the person in charge of finances is male or female is 
irrelevant to whether the household owns its home or not.  
 
6.2. The incidence of currently outstanding mortgages in US data 
Turning to factors influencing the incidence of currently outstanding mortgages conditional 
on homeownership, we find some similarities, but also a number of important differences with 
the Cyprus case. Having received inheritance reduces the probability of having a currently 
outstanding mortgage, as in the Cyprus case. Similar also is the positive effect of college 
education on the incidence of mortgages, conditional on homeownership. 
Unlike findings for Cyprus, wealth in financial or in non-residential real form, is strongly 
statistically significant for whether there is a currently outstanding mortgage on the US 
household’s residence, conditional on homeownership. Income is marginally insignificant.  
Occupational considerations now play a significant role in the incidence of outstanding 
mortgages for both employed and self-employed households, conditional on owning. Such 
occupational status encourages the use of mortgages, compared to retirement status. This 
finding may be at least partly due to a tendency to have paid off mortgages by the time of 
retirement, especially since US households are not asked if they ever had a mortgage on the 
current residence. More telling, perhaps, are the differences in coefficient estimates and 
significance between self-employed/employees and ‘others’. Gender does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the incidence of mortgages in the US, conditional on   23
homeownership, unlike our finding for Cyprus. These findings, together with the strong 
significance of the borrowing constraints indicator, reinforce the view that economic 
considerations matter strongly for whether US households have outstanding mortgages on the 
principal residence, unlike what we have found for Cyprus above. 
 
6.3. Pooled Regressions: US and Cyprus data 
In order to get a clearer idea of differences between Cyprus and the US and of their 
statistical significance, we run a probit with selection on pooled SCF and CySCF data. In this 
pooled regression, we include a country dummy for Cyprus, as well as interaction terms for all 
regressors in individual country estimation. Table 13 reports conditional marginal effects, i.e. 
effects on the probability of having an unpaid balance on the principal residence mortgage, 
conditional on homeownership. 
A clear pattern of results emerges. Controlling for household characteristics and ignoring 
any differences in the role of characteristics across the two countries, Cyprus households have a 
much lower probability of having a balance on their principal residence mortgage conditional 
on homeownership (a difference of nearly 67 percentage points). Both financial wealth and 
nonresidential wealth lower the conditional probability of an outstanding mortgage in the US. 
In both cases, Cyprus exhibits a difference in the conditional marginal effect of wealth that is 
not only statistically significant but also sufficient to eliminate the overall effect of either 
financial or non-residential wealth. 
Analogous results are obtained for occupational status. Being employed (either self-
employed or employee) rather than retired raises the conditional probability of an outstanding 
mortgage in the US substantially, by about 17 percentage points in each case. Not so in Cyprus, 
where estimated effects are negligible (indeed slightly negative). Finally, being liquidity 
constrained in the US raises the probability of an outstanding mortgage on principal residence   24
by almost 10 percentage points. Given the small number of such observations in Cyprus, the 
difference is not tightly estimated but its estimated size is of the same order, yielding an 
estimated conditional marginal effect of zero. 
All in all, pooled regressions confirm the impression obtained from individual country 
estimation, namely that effects of economic factors, such as types of wealth, occupational 
status, and borrowing constraints, are strongly present in the US but largely absent in Cyprus. 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
Social customs in the form of housing gifts can interfere with the role of housing in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Young households, who might be particularly sensitive to 
changes in interest rates and in availability of mortgages because of their limited resources, are 
much less likely to be affected if they receive a housing gift. Parents providing these gifts are 
much less likely to need to borrow to finance construction. If they do need to borrow, they are 
unlikely to forego or even postpone construction in the face of a tighter credit market, as they 
are constrained by social norms to deliver the house prior to the wedding. Parents who plan in 
advance are at best only able to postpone construction of the house to be offered. 
To illustrate the potential for social customs to interfere with usual housing channels of 
monetary transmission, we have compared Cyprus, a country in which housing gifts are 
prevalent and financial liberalization recent, to the US, a country that differs not only in stage 
of financial development but also in social norms with respect to housing gifts. We found 
limited incidence of mortgages and borrowing constraints, both in absolute terms and in 
comparison to the US. Controlling for a variety of household characteristics and for the 
presence of housing gifts or other family transfers, economic factors (such as resources and 
occupational status) are significantly less important for the incidence of mortgages conditional 
on homeownership in Cyprus compared to the US.    25
All in all, our findings suggest that social customs can weaken the strength of the 
housing channel in the monetary transmission mechanism and the potential for financial 
liberalization and accompanying innovation to draw more households into the commercial 
loans market. The limited incidence of mortgages and of binding borrowing constraints and the 
pattern of estimation results do not suggest that social customs can rapidly lose their influence 
on the housing market. It is perhaps telling that recent housing market pressures in Cyprus, 
prior to entering the Eurozone, were not checked even after use of a combination of monetary 
policy instruments, including an interest rate increase. 
Future research could probe further into the importance of social customs in other (e.g. 
Southern) countries, but could also extend analysis beyond the housing market. An important 
field would be the importance of the demographic transition for financing retirement. In aging 
societies, raising social security contributions could be infeasible or politically unacceptable, 
but the need for private retirement accounts and the consequences of limited planning for 
retirement could be limited if part of financing needs were met through increases in 
intergenerational transfers, from younger to older generations.   
 
    26
References: 
Antoniou, G., C. Argyridou, M. Haliassos, A. Karagrigoriou, G. Kyriacou, M. 
Michael, M. Papageorghiou and G. Syrichas (2004) "Assets and debts of Cyprus 
households: changes between the 1999 and 2002 Cyprus Surveys of Consumer 
Finances", mimeo. 
 
Aoki, K., J. Proudman and G. Vlieghe (2002) "House prices, consumption, and 
monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach", Bank of England Working 
Paper No. 169. 
 
Bernanke, B. and M. Gertler (2001) "Should central banks respond to movements in 
asset prices?", American Economic Review, 91(2): 253-57. 
 
Brady, R. (2004) "Consumer credit growth, households and the Federal Reserve: 
who’s really in trouble?", University of California, mimeo. 
 
Cecchetti, S., H. Genberg and S. Wadhwami (2003) "Asset prices in a flexible 
inflation targeting framework" in W.C. Hunter, G.G. Kaufman and M. 
Pomerleano (eds) Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and 
International Policies, Cambridge: MIT Press.   
 
Chiuri, M. C. and T. Jappelli (2003) "Financial market imperfections and home 
ownership: a comparative study", European Economic Review, 47(5): 857–75. 
 
Cox, D. (1990) "Intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints", Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105(1): 187-217. 
 
De Greef, J.J.M. and R.T.A. de Haas (2000) "Housing prices, bank lending and 
monetary policy", Research Series Supervision No 31, De Nederlandsche Bank. 
 
Engelhardt, G. V. (1994) "House prices and the decision to save for downpayments", 
Journal of Urban Economics, 36(2): 209-37. 
 
Engelhardt, G. V. and C. J. Mayer (1995) "Intergenerational transfers, borrowing 
constraints and saving behavior: evidence from the housing market", Working 
Paper No. 95-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
 
Giuliodori, M. (2005) "The role of house prices in the monetary transmission 
mechanism across European countries", Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 52(4): 
519-43. 
 
Guiso, L. and T. Jappelli (2002) "Private transfers, borrowing constraints, and the 
timing of home ownership", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 34(2): 315-39. 
 
Haliassos, M., C. Hassapis, A. Karagrigoriou, G. Kyriacou, M. Michael and G. 
Syrichas (2001) "Assets of Cyprus households: lessons from the first Cyprus 
Survey of Consumer Finances", mimeo.   27
 
Hall, R. E. (1978) "Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income 
hypothesis: theory and evidence", Journal of Political Economy, 86(6): 971-87. 
 
Hall, R. E. and F. S. Mishkin (1982) "The sensitivity of consumption to transitory 
income: estimates from panel data on households", Econometrica, 50(2): 461-82. 
 
Hubbard, R. G. and K. L. Judd (1986) "Liquidity constraints, fiscal policy, and 
consumption", Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No 1: 1-50. 
 
Hayashi, F. (1985) "The effects of liquidity constraints on consumption: a cross-
sectional analysis", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(1): 183-206. 
 
Iacoviello, M. (2000) "House prices and the macroeconomy in Europe: results from a 
structural VAR analysis", ECB Working Paper Series No. 18. 
 
Jappelli, T. (1990) "Who is credit constrained in the US economy?", Quarterly    




(2005) "The survey of consumer finances: sampling and surveying 
in Cyprus", Luxembourg Wealth Study, mimeo.  
 
Maclennan, D., J. Muellbauer and M. Stephens (1998) "Asymmetries in housing and 
financial market institutions and EMU", Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14(3): 
54–80. 
 
Mariger, R. P. (1986) Consumption Behavior and the Effects of Fiscal Policies, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Mishkin, F. S. (2001) "The transmission mechanism and the role of asset prices in 
monetary policy", NBER Working Paper, no. 8617. 
 
Mishkin, F. S. (2007) "Housing and the monetary transmission mechanism", NBER 
Working Paper, no. 13518. 
 
Mojon, B. (2000) "Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary 
policy", ECB Working Paper Series No. 40. 
 
Muellbauer, J. and R. Lattimore (1995) "The consumption function: a theoretical and 
empirical overview" in M. H. Pesaran and M. Wickens (eds) Handbook of Applied 
Econometrics, Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Zeldes, S. P. (1989) "Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical 
investigation", Journal of Political Economy, 97(2): 305-46.   28
Appendix: Description of Variables 
Age, age
2, log of income, log of non-residential wealth, log of financial wealth and log of 
outstanding mortgage debt: continuous variables. Log of income, log of non-residential 
wealth, log of financial wealth and log of outstanding mortgage debt are expressed in constant 
2001 prices. 
All others (except for employment status): binary variables that take the value 0 or 1. 
Employment status is categorical.  
 
Non-Residential Wealth = non-residential real estate wealth + business equity. Non-residential 
real estate wealth = Residential Property other than the primary residence – mortgage debt and 
other loans made for the acquirement of residential property other than the primary residence. 
Business Equity = net equity if business were sold today (business is included regardless of 
whether the household has active or inactive role in it) + loans from households to business – 
loans from business to households not reported earlier + value of personal assets used as 
collateral for business loans reported earlier.   
 
Financial Wealth = the value of the current accounts + value of time deposits + value of 
savings accounts + value of government bonds + value of certificates of deposits + value of 
savings bonds + value of mutual funds + value of corporate bonds + value of corporate warrants 
+ value of stocks (home and international) + other amounts owed to you – other amounts you 
owe to others. 
 
Advanced education: takes the value 1 if the head of the household had at least college 
education and takes the value 0 if he/she had attained at most secondary level of education.  
 
Marital status: in CySCF, it takes the value 1 if the head is married or lives together with his 
or her partner and takes the value 0 for single persons as well as for divorced and widowed 
people. In the SCF, it takes the value 1 if the head is married and the value 0 otherwise. 
 
Liquidity: takes the value 1 if the head of the household has ever been denied a loan in the past 
5 years or did not receive as much credit as requested or was discouraged from applying for a 
loan; and 0 otherwise.  
 
Employment status: in the CySCF, it is divided between retired people, those not working 
which include students and unemployed people, employees, self employed and others. In the 
case of the SCF data, employment status is divided between retired people, employees, self 
employed and others. However, the definition “others” is different for CySCF than for SCF. For 
CySCF, others refers to everybody else other than the four categories given above (retired 
people, those not working, employees and self employed), whereas for SCF, others refers to the 
unemployed and other inactive under the age of 65.  
 
“Aftostegasi”: takes the value 1 if the household was given funds to acquire its house as a 
result of being a refugee in the form of “aftostegasi” and 0 otherwise. We do not use an 
“aftostegasi” dummy in the first stage of the two-stage probit, as this would be a perfect 
predictor for ownership. However, we include it in the second stage to see its role in 
encouraging or discouraging mortgages. This variable is not applicable in the case of the SCF 
regression. 
 
Kids: takes the value 1 if the household has kids and 0 otherwise.   29
 
Inherit: in SCF data, it takes the value1 if the head of the household responds Yes to “Have 
you ever received an inheritance, or been given substantial assets in a trust or in some other 
form?” and 0 otherwise. In CySCF data: takes the value 1 if the household (husband or wife) 
has ever inherited wealth or been given a gift from their parents or relatives, and the value 0 
otherwise 
 
Home: takes the value 1 if the household owns its principal residence and the value 0 
otherwise. 
 
Has or has ever had mortgage: in CySCF data, it takes the value 1 if the household has or 
ever had mortgage on its primary residence and the value 0 otherwise. The retrospective part is 
not available in the SCF. 
 
Still owes on mortgage: in the SCF data, takes the value 1 if the household still owes on its 
primary residence and the value 0 otherwise. 
 
D2002: year dummy for the CySCF.  
D2001: year dummy for the SCF.  
 
The following variables apply only in the case of CySCF: 
 
Has received house as gift: takes the value 1 if the respondent says that the household has 
received all or part of the current residence as a gift from parents, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Expects inheritance: takes the value 1 if the respondent says that the household expects to 
inherit wealth in the future, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Intending to provide a bequest: takes the value 1 if the household (husband or wife) intends 
to leave bequest to their offspring, and the value 0 otherwise. 
 
Outstanding mortgage debt: the mortgage amount still owed by the household. 
 
Capital gains: takes the value 1 if the household had any capital gains through its participation 
in the stock market, and the value 0 otherwise.   30
Appendix: Brief Description of CySCF Database 
 
Since 1996, the Central Bank of Cyprus has funded a joint project of a research team 
from the University of Cyprus and from the Research Department of the Central Bank to set up 
a Cyprus Survey of Consumer Finances, quite along the lines of the US Survey of Consumer 
Finances run by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  
 
The 1999 Survey contains responses from 1097 households living in Cyprus (excluding 
occupied territories) in two sub-samples. One is a representative of the Cyprus population and 
consists of 539 households, while the second is confined to wealthy households and has a 
sample size of 558. The oversampling of wealthy households is a practice followed 
internationally in order to handle skewed wealth distribution and the fact that most of the 
wealth and the greatest variety of assets are held by the wealthy that represent a very small 
proportion of the population. Respectively, the sample size for the 2002 Survey is 897, 521 of 
which represent the general population and 376 represent the wealthy sample. The sample was 
reduced to a total of 1830 observations, by omitting households that live in Turkish Cypriot or 
refugee housing. 
 
The questionnaire of the Cyprus Survey of Consumer Finances is divided into sixteen 
chapters that cover demographic characteristics, assets and liabilities of the respondents. It 
combines and adapts elements from the US Survey of Consumer Finances with some from the 
CentER Survey in the Netherlands. It is further augmented to ensure coverage of issues specific 
to Cyprus. The interviewing mode adopts the paper-and-pencil (or PAPI) data collection 
process that was followed in the US prior to laptop-based interviews, rather the on-line 
interactive approach taken by the Netherlands Survey (see Haliassos et al, 2003).    31
Table 1:  Cyprus Household Participation Rates in Assets  
CySCF 
 




Assets    
Financial  89.8 92.9 
Liquid Accounts  82.2  85.2 
Government Bonds  50.7  43.6 
of which:  Development Stock   1.6  0.8 
                 Saving Certificates  0.4  1.4 
                 Savings Bonds  48.1  41.1 
Other Bonds  5.1  10.6 
Stocks 25.3  51.4 
Mutual Funds  0.4  1.0 
Retirement Accounts  12.5  51.3 
Life Insurance Investment 
Policies 
31.1 32.8 
                 Term Insurance  18.0  13.5 
                 Whole Life 
Insurance 
8.5 10.5 
                 Endowment 
Insurance 
9.5 12.5 
    
Non-financial  98.2 100.0 
Primary Residence  86.0  83.1 
Investment Real Estate  31.8  33.2 
Business Equity  25.1  22.5 
Other non-financial (mostly 
vehicles) 
91.6 90.7 
Source: Antoniou et al. (2004). 
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Table 2:  Cyprus Household Participation Rates in Debts 
CySCF 
 




Any Debt  63.14 62.29 
Home Secured Debt  29.95  29.77 
Debt secured on other 
Residential Property 
4.96 6.37 
Credit card balances  20.11  20.37 
Other lines of credit  3.62  3.39 
Car loans  6.13  17.62 
Educational loans  7.18  5.01 
Other debt  25.94  24.99 
Source: Cyprus Survey of Consumer Finances, 1999 and 2002. 
 
 







Home Secured Debt  56.38  54.80 
Debt secured on other 
Residential Property 
13.16 17.22 
Car loans  3.20  5.33 
Educational loans  6.72  5.08 
Credit card balances  1.60  1.92 
Other lines of credit  0.29  0.15 
Other loans  18.65  15.51 
Total  100 100 
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Table 4:  Household Participation in Home Secured Debt by Age, Cyprus 
CySCF 
 




Less than 29  22.36  25.13 
30-39 41.60  45.33 
40-49 40.24  39.37 
50-59 23.11  30.69 
60-69 10.87  10.92 
70 or more  1.67  1.88 




Table 5:  Share of Home Secured Debt in Total Household Debt, by Age 
CySCF, Households with home secured debt 
 




Less than 29  51.89  52.88 
30-39 71.82  60.39 
40-49 54.64  61.93 
50-59 49.27  50.66 
60-69 25.42  27.23 
70 or more  5.02  6.92 
Source: Cyprus Survey of Consumer Finances, 1999 and 2002. 
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Table 6:  Recipients of Housing Gifts in Cyprus, by Characteristic 
CySCF 
 
Distribution of all Households 
who Report  Having received 
current residence as a gift 
Distribution of Homeowners who 
Report  Having received current 










All Households  39.05 39.35 45.42 47.38 
Age             
20-29 7.69  9.52  7.77  8.87 
30-39 32.07  23.51  32.82  24.16 
40-49 29.15  27.89  28.41  28.85 
50-59 21.15  18.94  22.04  20.57 
60-69 5.67  12.09  4.77  11.13 
70 and above  4.26  8.05  4.18  6.42 
Education             
No high-school 
certificate 33.38  34.12  29.81  34.07 
High school 
certificate 39.9  36.85  38.57  34.52 
Advanced 
Education 26.72  29.03  31.62  31.41 
Marital Status             
Married 93.05  91.81  92.83  91.98 
Single, divorced, 
widowed 6.95  8.19  7.17  8.02 
Income             
Quartile I 
(poorest) 28.37  20.27  26.46  21.14 
Quartile II  26.78  32.42  23.86  28.42 
Quartile III  30.5  31.16  31.71  29.28 
Quartile IV  14.35  16.19  17.97  21.26 
Non Residential 
Wealth             
Quartile I 
(poorest) 23.79  21.5  23.11  21.89 
Quartile II  24.14  26.95  25.59  27.82 
Quartile III  25.49  26.01  26.03  24.63 
Quartile IV  26.58  25.54  25.26  25.67 
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Table 7a:  Determinants of Having or Having Ever Had a Mortgage on the Current Residence, 
Conditional on Owning Current Residence 
CySCF, Probit model with selection 
 




P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Has or has ever had mortgage on current residence 
Age -0.014  0.004  0.002  -0.023  -0.005 
Male  0.215  0.091 0.018 0.036 0.393 
Married 0.034  0.245  0.889  -0.445  0.514 
Log of Income  0.095  0.056  0.088  -0.014  0.204 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  -0.003  0.005  0.583  -0.014  0.008 
Log Financial Wealth  -0.016  0.011  0.122  -0.037  0.004 
Kids 0.070  0.107  0.516  -0.140  0.279 
Employees -0.020  0.091  0.825  -0.199  0.159 
Self Employed  0.085  0.102  0.409  -0.116  0.285 
Not Working  0.098  0.239  0.680  -0.370  0.567 
Others 0.059  0.218  0.788  -0.369  0.487 
Aftostegasi 0.003  0.137  0.980  -0.265  0.272 
Advanced  Education  0.220  0.068 0.001 0.088 0.353 
Liquidity 0.248  0.339  0.464  -0.416  0.912 
D2002 -0.166  0.076  0.028  -0.315  -0.018 
Constant -0.296  0.635  0.641  -1.541  0.949 
Owns current residence 
Age 0.094  0.048  0.050  -0.00001  0.188 
Age
2   -0.001 0.0005  0.106 -0.002  0.0002 
Male -0.307  0.196  0.118  -0.692  0.078 
Married  0.597  0.136 0.000 0.332 0.863 
Log of Income  0.008  0.059  0.895  -0.109  0.124 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  0.013  0.009  0.122  -0.004  0.030 
Log Financial Wealth  0.037  0.014  0.011  0.008  0.065 
Kids  0.506  0.247 0.041 0.022 0.989 
Employees -0.128  0.161  0.424  -0.443  0.186 
Self Employed  -0.299  0.175  0.087  -0.641  0.043 
Not Working  -0.391  0.364  0.283  -1.104  0.322 
Others 0.008  0.321  0.981  -0.621  0.636 
Advanced Education  -0.218  0.098  0.025  -0.410  -0.027 
Liquidity -0.411  0.352  0.242  -1.101  0.278 
D2002 0.024  0.166  0.883  -0.300  0.349 
Constant -1.782  1.439  0.216  -4.602  1.039 
ρ  -0.968 0.481       
Wald test of indep. Equations (ρ =0): 
2 Χ (1) = 0.07   Prob > 
2 Χ  = 0.7862 
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Std. error  P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Male 0.073  0.043  0.090  -0.011  0.157 
Married 0.070  0.113  0.532  -0.150  0.291 
Log of Income  0.040  0.025  0.106  -0.009  0.089 
Log of Non-
residential Wealth 
-0.0005 0.002  0.830  -0.005  0.004 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
-0.005 0.004  0.277  -0.013  0.004 
Kids 0.074  0.048  0.123  -0.020  0.169 
Employees -0.016  0.037  0.672  -0.089  0.058 
Self Employed  0.016  0.042  0.704  -0.067  0.099 
Not Working  0.011  0.109  0.917  -0.203  0.226 
Others 0.025  0.091  0.782  -0.153  0.204 
Aftostegasi 0.001  0.058  0.980  -0.112  0.114 
Advanced  Education  0.080  0.027  0.003 0.026 0.133 
Liquidity 0.075  0.151  0.620  -0.221  0.370 
D2002 -0.069  0.036  0.060  -0.140  0.003 
Age -0.0004  0.002  0.849  -0.005  0.004 
Age
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Table 8:  Determinants of the Probability that the Current Residence was a Gift 
CySCF, Probit model  
 
Independent 




P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Age -0.008  0.015  0.603  -0.037  0.022 
Age
2   -0.00002 0.0001 0.908  -0.0003  0.0003 
Male -0.144  0.066  0.029  -0.274  -0.014 
Married 0.260  0.114  0.023  0.035  0.484 
Log of Income  -0.052  0.032  0.100  -0.114  0.010 
Log of Non 
Residential 
Wealth 
-0.0001 0.006  0.982  -0.011  0.011 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
0.009 0.010  0.330  -0.009  0.028 
Kids 0.408  0.116  0.000  0.179  0.636 
Not Working  0.099  0.199  0.620  -0.292  0.490 
Advanced 
Education 
-0.112 0.068  0.099  -0.245  0.021 
D2002 -0.134  0.062  0.030  -0.255  -0.013 
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Table 9:  Determinants of the Probability of reporting expectation to leave a bequest  
CySCF, Probit model  
 




P>|z|  95% conf. 
interval 
Has received house as Gift  0.222  0.075  0.003  0.076  0.369 
Expects inheritance  0.459  0.101  0.000  0.261  0.657 
Age -0.009  0.016  0.572  -0.041  0.023 
Age
2   0.0001 0.0002  0.696 -
0.0002 
0.0004 
Male 0.012  0.074  0.872  -0.133  0.157 
Married 0.295  0.114  0.010  0.071  0.519 
Log of Income  0.024  0.035  0.496  -0.045  0.092 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  0.031  0.006  0.000  0.018  0.043 
Log of Financial Wealth  0.040  0.010  0.000  0.020  0.060 
Kids 0.320  0.118  0.006  0.090  0.551 
Advanced Education  0.102  0.078  0.189  -0.050  0.254 
Capital Gains  0.239  0.108  0.026  0.029  0.450 
Log of Outstanding Mortgage Debt  -0.005  0.008  0.492  -0.021  0.010 
Home 0.420  0.130  0.001  0.166  0.674 
D2002 0.146  0.069  0.035  0.010  0.281 
Constant -0.884  0.441  0.045  -1.747  -0.020 
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Table 10:  Determinants of Having or Having Ever Had a Mortgage on the Current 
Residence, Controlling for whether the current residence was received as a gift  
CySCF, Probit model with selection  
 




P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Has or has ever had mortgage on current residence 
Age -0.018  0.003  0.000  -0.024  -0.012 
Male  0.202  0.068 0.003 0.068  0.336 
Married 0.106  0.145  0.465  -0.179  0.391 
Log of Income  0.086  0.047  0.064  -0.005  0.178 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  -0.003  0.006  0.620  -0.014  0.008 
Log Financial Wealth  -0.017  0.010  0.107  -0.037  0.004 
Kids 0.154  0.113  0.174  -0.068  0.375 
Employees  -0.056 0.092  0.546  -0.236 0.125 
Self Employed  0.039  0.104  0.711  -0.166  0.243 
Not Working  0.127  0.228  0.576  -0.319  0.574 
Others 0.077  0.202  0.704  -0.318  0.472 
Has Received house as Gift  -0.604  0.068  0.000  -0.738  -0.470 
Aftostegasi  -0.094 0.089  0.288  -0.268 0.080 
Adv.  Education  0.204  0.068 0.003 0.070  0.338 
Liquidity 0.292  0.291  0.316  -0.279  0.862 
D2002 -0.195  0.062  0.002  -0.318  -0.072 
Constant 0.139  0.510  0.786  -0.860  1.138 
Owns current residence 
Age  0.098  0.018 0.000 0.062  0.134 
Age
2   -0.001 0.0002  0.000  -0.001 -0.0005 
Male -0.318  0.106  0.003  -0.526  -0.110 
Married  0.610  0.133 0.000 0.350  0.871 
Log of Income  0.011  0.055  0.842  -0.097  0.119 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  0.015  0.009  0.117  -0.004  0.033 
Log Financial Wealth  0.034  0.016  0.033  0.003  0.065 
Kids  0.489  0.140 0.000 0.215  0.763 
Employees  -0.146 0.157  0.354  -0.454 0.163 
Self  Employed  -0.316 0.179  0.078  -0.667 0.036 
Not  Working  -0.361 0.321  0.261  -0.991 0.269 
Others  -0.033 0.322  0.919  -0.665 0.599 
Adv. Education  -0.220  0.098  0.025  -0.411  -0.028 
Liquidity  -0.401 0.349  0.251  -1.086 0.284 
D2002 0.029  0.098  0.768  -0.164  0.222 
Constant -1.872  0.720  0.009  -3.283  -0.460 
ρ  -0.935 0.241      
Wald test of indep. Equations (ρ =0): 
2 Χ (1) = 0.78   Prob > 
2 Χ  = 0.3757 
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P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Male 0.067  0.028  0.015  0.013  0.121 
Married 0.104  0.062  0.093  -0.018  0.226 
Log of Income  0.037  0.020  0.070  -0.003  0.077 
Log of Non 
Residential Wealth 
-0.0003 0.002 0.886  -0.005  0.004 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
-0.005 0.004  0.242  -0.014  0.003 
Kids 0.110  0.046  0.017  0.020  0.199 
Employees -0.032  0.037  0.395  -0.104  0.041 
Self Employed  -0.005  0.043  0.913  -0.089  0.080 
Not Working  0.027  0.095  0.772  -0.158  0.213 
Others 0.030  0.084  0.717  -0.134  0.194 
Has Received current 
residence as gift 
-0.251 0.028  0.000  -0.305  -0.197 
Aftostegasi -0.040  0.037  0.289  -0.113  0.034 
Advanced Education  0.073  0.028  0.008  0.019  0.127 
Liquidity 0.094  0.121  0.437  -0.144  0.332 
D2002 -0.080  0.026  0.002  -0.130  -0.030 
Age -0.002  0.002  0.217  -0.005  0.001 
Age
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Table 11:  Determinants of Having or Having Ever Had a Mortgage on the Current 
Residence, Controlling for whether household has received any inheritance or gift from 
parents or relatives  
CySCF, Probit model with selection  
 




P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Has or has ever had mortgage on current residence 
Age -0.015  0.003  0.000  -0.020  -0.009 
Male 0.203  0.069  0.003  0.068  0.338 
Married 0.055  0.131  0.673  -0.202  0.312 
Log of Income  0.094  0.040  0.020  0.015  0.173 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  -0.002  0.005  0.760  -0.012  0.009 
Log Financial Wealth  -0.014  0.010  0.140  -0.033  0.005 
Kids 0.097  0.108  0.370  -0.114  0.307 
Employees -0.022  0.090  0.806  -0.199  0.155 
Self Employed  0.077  0.103  0.455  -0.125  0.278 
Not Working  0.107  0.226  0.637  -0.337  0.551 
Others 0.058  0.202  0.773  -0.337  0.453 
Inherit -0.165  0.062  0.008  -0.287  -0.043 
Aftostegasi -0.017  0.082  0.831  -0.178  0.143 
Adv. Education  0.232  0.067  0.001  0.101  0.364 
Liquidity 0.246  0.288  0.393  -0.318  0.810 
D2002 -0.158  0.062  0.011  -0.280  -0.036 
Constant -0.214  0.413  0.604  -1.024  0.595 
Owns current residence 
Age 0.095  0.023  0.000  0.050  0.140 
Age
2   -0.001 0.0002  0.000  -0.001  -0.0004 
Male -0.309  0.111  0.005  -0.526  -0.092 
Married 0.604  0.135  0.000  0.339  8.677 
Log of Income  0.009  0.043  0.836  -0.075  0.093 
Log of Non Residential Wealth  0.014  0.009  0.118  -0.003  0.031 
Log of Financial Wealth  0.037  0.015  0.011  0.009  0.066 
Kids 0.502  0.151  0.001  0.206  0.798 
Employees -0.140  0.158  0.375  -0.451  0.170 
Self Employed  -0.312  0.178  0.080  -0.662  0.037 
Not Working  -0.395  0.330  0.232  -1.042  0.252 
Others -0.017  0.320  0.958  -0.644  0.610 
Adv. Education  -0.225  0.098  0.022  -0.417  -0.033 
Liquidity -0.393  0.346  0.256  -1.070  0.284 
D2002 0.030  0.097  0.756  -0.161  0.221 
Constant -1.812  0.695  0.009  -3.175  -0.449 
ρ  -0.958 0.175       
Wald test of indep. equations (ρ=0): 
2 Χ (1) = 0.82   Prob > 
2 Χ  = 0.3666 
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Std. error  P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Male  0.068 0.028  0.017  0.012 0.124 
Married 0.081  0.056  0.147  -0.028  0.190 
Log of Income  0.040  0.017  0.016  0.007  0.073 
Log of Non-
residential Wealth 
0.0001 0.002  0.970  -0.004 0.004 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
-0.004 0.004  0.321  -0.011 0.004 
Kids 0.086  0.045  0.056  -0.002  0.174 
Employees  -0.017 0.037  0.634  -0.089 0.054 
Self Employed  0.012  0.043  0.784  -0.072  0.095 
Not Working  0.015  0.098  0.879  -0.177  0.207 
Others 0.023  0.083  0.779  -0.140  0.187 
Inherit -0.069  0.026  0.008  -0.120  -0.018 
Aftostegasi  -0.007 0.035  0.831  -0.075 0.060 
Advanced  Education  0.084 0.027  0.002  0.031 0.137 
Liquidity 0.076  0.122  0.535  -0.164  0.315 
D2002 -0.065  0.026  0.012  -0.115  -0.014 
Age  -0.001 0.002  0.713  -0.004 0.003 
Age
2   -0.00005 0.00002 0.002  -0.0001 -0.00002 
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Table 12:  Determinants of Having Outstanding Balance on Mortgage for the Current 
Residence, Controlling for whether household has received inheritance  
SCF, Probit model with selection  
 




P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Has outstanding balance on mortgage for current residence 
Age -0.032  0.002  0.000  -0.035  -0.028 
Male 0.102  0.066  0.122  -0.027  0.232 
Married -0.030  0.056  0.597  -0.140  0.080 
Log Income  -0.024  0.015  0.106  -0.054  0.005 
Log of Non Residential 
Wealth 
-0.019 0.003  0.000  -0.026  -0.012 
Log  Financial Wealth  -0.072  0.009  0.000  -0.089  -0.054 
Kids  0.112  0.038  0.003 0.037 0.187 
Employees  0.427  0.055  0.000 0.320 0.534 
Self  Employed  0.497  0.058  0.000 0.383 0.611 
Others 0.163  0.114  0.153  -0.061  0.387 
Inherit -0.129  0.037  0.000  -0.201  -0.057 
Adv.  Education  0.282  0.039  0.000 0.206 0.358 
Liquidity  0.377  0.065  0.000 0.251 0.503 
D2001 -0.006  0.034  0.862  -0.072  0.060 
Constant  2.888  0.170  0.000 2.554 3.222 
Owns current residence 
Age  0.088  0.006  0.000 0.076 0.101 
Age
2   -0.001 0.0001  0.000  -0.001  -0.001 
Male 0.022  0.056  0.695  -0.087  0.131 
Married  0.553  0.052  0.000 0.452 0.654 
Log  Income  0.094  0.018  0.000  0.059  0.129 
Log of Non-residential 
Wealth 
0.025  0.004  0.000 0.016 0.034 
Log Financial Wealth  0.136  0.007  0.000  0.122  0.150 
Kids  0.387  0.040  0.000 0.310 0.465 
Employees -0.053  0.064  0.409  -0.179  0.073 
Self Employed  -0.011  0.076  0.887  -0.160  0.139 
Others -0.123  0.099  0.214  -0.316  0.071 
Adv. Education  -0.109  0.040  0.006  -0.187  -0.031 
Liquidity -0.452  0.043  0.000  -0.538  -0.367 
D2001 -0.002  0.034  0.963  -0.069  0.066 
Constant -4.823  0.212  0.000  -5.239  -4.406 
ρ  -0.848  0.029     
Wald test of indep. Equations (rho=0): 
2 Χ (1) = 144.69   Prob > 
2 Χ  = 0.0000 
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Std. error  P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Male 0.040  0.024  0.090  -0.006  0.086 
Married  0.049  0.021 0.018 0.008  0.090 
Log of Income  0.0001  0.005  0.986  -0.010  0.010 
Log of Non- 
residential Wealth 
-0.005 0.001  0.000  -0.007 -0.002 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
-0.013 0.003  0.000  -0.019 -0.007 
Kids  0.075  0.013 0.000 0.049  0.102 
Employees  0.148  0.019 0.000 0.112  0.185 
Self  Employed  0.160  0.016 0.000 0.128  0.192 
Others 0.045  0.035  0.199  -0.024  0.114 
Inherit -0.048  0.014  0.001  -0.075  -0.020 
Advanced  Education  0.091  0.013 0.000 0.065  0.116 
Liquidity  0.085  0.020 0.000 0.046  0.124 
D2001  -0.002 0.012  0.848  -0.025 0.021 
Age -0.003  0.001  0.000  -0.005  -0.001 
Age


















Table 13:  Effects on Probability of Having Outstanding Balance on Principal Residence 
Mortgage, Conditional on owning the principal residence  






P>|z|  95% conf. interval 
Male 0.044  0.025  0.078  -0.005  0.093 
Married  0.049  0.022  0.029 0.005 0.092 
Log of Income  -0.0005  0.005  0.922  -0.011  0.010 
Log of Non 
Residential Wealth 
-0.005 0.001 0.000  -0.008  -0.002 
Log of Financial 
Wealth 
-0.016 0.003 0.000  -0.022  -0.009 
Kids  0.087  0.015  0.000 0.059 0.116 
Employees  0.170  0.019  0.000 0.132 0.207 
Self  Employed  0.182  0.018  0.000 0.147 0.217 
Others 0.059  0.038  0.120  -0.015  0.133 
Inherit -0.052  0.015  0.000  -0.081  -0.023 
Advanced 
Education 
0.100  0.014  0.000 0.072 0.128 
Liquidity  0.098  0.022  0.000 0.055 0.141 
Cyprus dummy  -0.667  0.078  0.000  -0.819  -0.514 
Dummy*male -0.011  0.037  0.772  -0.084  0.063 
Dummy*married 0.052  0.043  0.233 -0.033 0.137 
Dummy* Log of 
Income 
0.021 0.014 0.146  -0.007  0.049 
Dummy* Log of 
Non-residential 
Wealth 
0.006  0.003  0.016 0.001 0.011 
Dummy* Log 
Financial Wealth 
0.016  0.005  0.001 0.006 0.025 
Dummy* Kids  0.035  0.042  0.403  -0.047  0.117 
Dummy*Inherit -0.021  0.029  0.476  -0.078  0.036 
Dummy* 
Employees 
-0.192 0.044 0.000  -0.278  -0.106 
Dummy* Self 
Employed 
-0.198 0.053 0.000  -0.302  -0.095 
Dummy* Others  -0.079  0.080  0.322  -0.235  0.077 
Dummy* Adv. 
Education 
-0.040 0.031 0.208  -0.101  0.022 
Dummy* Liquidity  -0.099  0.107  0.354  -0.309  0.111 
Age -0.003  0.001  0.000  -0.005  -0.001 
Age
2   -0.0001 0.00001  0.000  -0.00008 -0.00005 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 See also Engelhardt (1994), Muellbauer and Lattimore (1995), Maclennan et al. (1998), Greef and Haas (2000), 
Mojon (2000), Iacoviello (2000), Mishkin (2001), Aoki et al. (2002), Chiuri and Jappelli (2003), Giuliodori (2005). 
2 The empirical importance of housing gifts has been established in a slightly different context by Guiso and 
Jappelli (2002) using Italian data. Guiso and Jappelli found substantial real effects of the presence of inter vivos 
housing gifts on the time it takes households to acquire a home and on the value of the acquired home. 
3 Cooperative Credit and Savings societies are neither subject to the supervision of the Central Bank of Cyprus nor 
to the prudential standards applied to other credit institutions. Rather, they have indirect access to monetary credit 
through the Cooperative Central Bank Ltd which acts as their central bank. The Cooperative Societies’ Supervision 
and Development Authority which reports to the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism supervises the 
operations of coops in order to ensure that they are in compliance with the relevant laws. 
4 In 1999, the General Stock Market Index shot up by close to 700%, with numerous households entering the stock 
market for the first time and a measured participation rate in direct stockholding of about 25%. In 2000, the 
General Index fell by about 60% after a sizeable number of new investors had just entered. 
5 Monetary data are obtained from commercial banks’ balance sheets. At the time being the data do not distinguish 
between mortgages and the construction sector. 
6 Financial assets include liquid accounts, such as checking and saving accounts, government bonds, other bonds 
(mainly corporate), stocks, mutual funds, retirement accounts, and the cash value of life insurance. 
7 The biggest proportion of government bond holdings refers to government savings bonds. The popularity of these 
bonds can be attributed to the fact that they are government paper of low denomination, but also to their monthly 
participation in lottery drawings that can result in substantial returns but with a guarantee minimum return. Since 
2002 this particular type of savings bonds has been gradually discontinued. 
8 Non-financial assets include the primary residence and other real estate that could be used for investment 
purposes, equity in businesses, and vehicles. 
9 Liabilities include mortgages, loans for investment in real estate, consumer and student loans, and credit card 
balances. 
10 The incidence of liquidity constraints is regarded as much higher in countries at the peak of financial 
development, such as the US. Following pioneering work by Hall (1978) that used time-series data to test for 
liquidity constraints, a number of papers have emphasized the existence of liquidity constraints in US data. Hall 
and Mishkin (1982), and Mariger (1986) used the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, while Hubbard and Judd 
(1986) used the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances to show that approximately 20% of the US population is credit 
constrained. At the same time Hayashi (1985) and Zeldes (1989) indicate that sensitivity of consumption to income 
changes depends on household wealth and, in particular, younger households with low levels of wealth and savings 
are more likely to face liquidity constraints. Jappelli (1990) also uses the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 
to show that 20% of the sample consists of rejected applicants and discouraged borrowers, while current income, 
wealth, and age are the most important determinants of the probability of one being denied a loan. 
11 In 1999, 40% of Cyprus households who said they were initially rejected from obtaining a loan also said that they 
managed to obtain a loan by re-applying to the banking institution that initially rejected them. The respective 
percentage for 2002 was higher, about 73%. 
12 Since 1992, the Cyprus pound had been pegged to the ecu and subsequently to the Euro at a parity of €1,7086 = 
CYP 1 and a target zone of ±2.25%. In August of 2001 the narrow bands around the central parity were abandoned 
and the wider bands of ±15% were adopted, in order to alert the public of the exchange rate risk stemming from the 
concurrent gradual lifting of capital controls that came along the liberalization of the financial system. 
13 These are: (i) Greek Cypriot households that were displaced from their properties in the North and were given 
temporarily Turkish Cypriot properties to live in; and (ii) refugee households that live in state-provided refugee 
housing. 
14 Interestingly, another social custom could facilitate mortgages for newlyweds not receiving a housing gift. 
Common practice in Cyprus is to hold large weddings and to give monetary gifts to the newlyweds. The resulting 
total monetary gift can represent a sizeable lump sum, equivalent to a down payment on a house purchase. 
15 Notice, however, that our findings do not preclude downsizing of the owned residence. 
16 The possibility of some reduction in the incidence of parental housing gifts over time is present in principle, but 
the high and roughly constant incidence of housing gifts in the two Surveys suggests that any such reductions are 
extremely slow. 
17 Ideally, we would like to observe whether the household has ever received a housing gift, but this is not available 
in the data. So, strictly speaking, our findings refer to the joint event of getting a housing gift and remaining in that 
initial house by the time of the interview. 
18 An indicator of parent support for education is the pattern of participation in student loans. The greatest 
participation rates in student loans, in both Cyprus surveys, are observed for households between 50 and 59 years   47
                                                                                                                                                            
old (above 12%) with corresponding participation rates for households below 29 years of age well under 4%. This 
reflects the fact that student loans are usually not taken by the students themselves but by their parents. This is not 
surprising, in the absence of a government-guaranteed system of student loans. Indeed, the overall incidence of 
student loans is quite limited in Cyprus. According to CySCF, the percentage of households with student loans 
outstanding is of the order of 7% and 5% in 1999 and 2002, respectively. 
19 It is not a perfect predictor of mortgages, because it can also refer to partial gifts or to mortgages for extensions 
and other home improvements. 
20 There are also some small differences in the definition of occupational variables. 